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Abstract
In this thesis, I first investigate the widespread methods used in antitrust investiga-
tions in the hospital markets. Then, pointing out their ineffectiveness in convincing the
courts, I offer a metric called “competitive pressure rate” which is based on Google Maps
travel time data as an alternative approach to market definition. I test the effects of the new
metric on market prices by an OLS estimation applied to the data from California Office
of Health Planning and Development. I provide strong evidence for the existence of corre-
lation between geographic clustering of general acute care hospitals and hospital charges.
In particular, I show that a one-unit increase in the competitive pressure rate for normal
newborn services would have resulted in a price decrease of 0:71% in 2010 and 0:52%
in 2012. This corresponds to annual savings of $9; 448; 000 in 2010 and $7; 582; 000 in
2012.
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HASTANE BİRLEŞMELERİNDE PİYASA TANIMI ANALİZİNE
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Fatih ÇAKMAK
Ekonomi, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2015
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Eren İNCİ
Anahtar Kelimeler: hastane; birleşme; antitröst; piyasa tanımı
Özet
Bu tezde önce, hastane piyasalarındaki antitröst soruşturmalarında genel olarak kul-
lanılan yöntemleri incelenmektedir. Daha sonra, bu yöntemlerin mahkemelerin iknasın-
daki etkinsizliğine dikkat çekerek, piyasa tanımına alternatif bir yaklaşım olarak “reka-
bet baskısı” oranı sunulmaktadır. Google Haritalar ulaşım süresi verilerine dayanılarak,
piyasa dinamiklerine ilişkin basit ve tutarlı bir içgörü sağlanmaktadır. Tezde, bu oranın
piyasa fiyatları üzerindeki etkisi California Sağlık Planlama ve Geliştirme Ofisi verileri
ile EKK tahmini yöntemi kullanılarak test edilmektedir. Bulgular ile, genel akut hizmet
hastanelerinin coğrafi kümelenmesi ile hastane ücretleri arasındaki korelasyonun varlığına
ilişkin kuvvetli bir kanıt ortaya konulmaktadır. İnceleme sonuçları, rekabet baskısı oranın-
daki bir birimlik artışın, yenidoğan hizmetlerine ilişkin olarak yılda, sırasıyla 2010 ve 2012
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1 Introduction
Health care industry is a steadily growing, indispensable and capital intensive behemoth
and hospitals form the core of this humongous structure. Its idiosyncratic composition and
the gravity of the production and protection of health care turn it into a unique field where
economic theory and standard policy mechanisms do not apply per se. Under substantial
influence of numerous unquantifiable factors such as “morbidity” and “health stock” and
intertwined with ethics and political ideology, there simply does not exist a panacea for
the issues in health care industry. Therefore general solutions and guidelines require a
thorough reconsideration to generate successful outcomes. In that sense, a most debated
theme in health care industry is the design of the antitrust enforcement in order to protect
current and potential competition aiming a market structure which ensures a sustainable
level of consumer welfare.
In this paper I deliver a survey of the chronicles of the antitrust enforcement in the
hospital sector and construct a metric depicting the influence of geographical proximity
which would build a pathway for a better comprehension of the relevant market in an-
titrust analysis. In order to maintain a manageable scale I will keep my analysis limited
to the hospital markets in the US. As an initial step, it is crucial to define the problem
in order to develop a reasonable solution approach. After providing a panorama of the
industry, I will introduce the antitrust experiences in the American hospital markets. Fol-
lowing the antitrust chronicles, it will be appropriate to move on to the main body of the
paper, evaluating the fundamental aspects of the antitrust enforcement in the hospital in-
dustry: market definition consisting of two intertwined elements: geographic and product
market definitions, the importance of the non-profit status of hospitals, and the impacts
on welfare. In the following chapter, given the details of the antitrust enforcement meth-
ods, I will analyze the research on competition in the hospital markets, pointing out the
data specific issues and any inconsistencies inherent in the models developed. Given the
current issues in antitrust theory, I will present the core chapter of the paper introducing
a metric in an attempt to redefine the principles of constructing the geographic market. I
will conclude my study mentioning the ongoing research and developments in the relevant
antitrust enforcement methodologies providing insight regarding the expectations in the
hospital markets.
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2 Overview of the Hospital Markets in the US
The institutional status of hospitals in the US is categorized under three headings: (1)
publicly owned, (2) non-profit, and (3) for-profit. In a simplistic view, this categorization
might be considered as a clear-cut distinction between the agents in the market. However
in practice, it turns out to be quite difficult to sustain such a basic classification system.
When multi-hospital ownership issues are introduced, it becomes troublesome to position
a hospital system consisting of hospitals with different characteristics under distinct head-
ings. In addition to that, we cannot assume permanency of the institutional status of the
hospitals. It is observed that every year approximately one percent of the hospitals in the
US experience an institutional status change (FTC, 2004).
Another popular type of hospital categorization is performed with respect to the
sophistication of the services provided by the institution. Hospitals are mainly divided
into four categories: (1) primary, (2) secondary, (3) tertiary, and (4) quaternary. The
sophistication of the health care services provided escalate from the most fundamental
ones at the primary hospitals, to the state-of-the-art operations and facilities including
sub-specialty services such as organ transplantation at the quaternary level. However,
this method is also considered problematic as hospitals might invest in services in certain
specialties and develop more sophisticated capabilities in those fields while restraining the
service level complexity in other fields (FTC, 2004).
Assessing from a financial perspective, currently, 58%of the total community hospi-
tals is categorized as non-profit hospitals and they have approximate 68% of the inpatient1
beds. Possessing a smaller share, for-profit hospitals make up 21% of the hospital market
with 16% of the total number of inpatient beds. The rest (21% with 16% of the inpa-
tient beds) is run by the government at a federal, state or local level (NCHS, 2013). This
classification is noteworthy due to its widespread use in policy design.
An alternative approach in categorization of hospitals is to provide an interpreta-
tion based on the costs incurred. A major portion of the costs are incurred to the society
1According to CMS, inpatient hospital services are defined as follows:
“Inpatient hospital services are defined in Title XVIII of the Social Security Act (the Act) and in the
regulations (42 CFR 409.10):
Subject to the conditions, limitations, and exceptions set forth in this subpart, the term “inpatient hospital
or inpatient CAH services” means the following services furnished to an inpatient of a participating hospital
or of a participating CAH or, in the case of emergency services or services in foreign hospitals, to an inpatient
of a qualified hospital:
1. Bed and board, 2. Nursing services and other related services, 3. Use of hospital or CAH facilities,
4. Medical social services, 5. Drugs, biologicals, supplies, appliances, and equipment, 6. Certain other
diagnostic or therapeutic services, 7. Medical or surgical services provided by certain interns or residents-
in-training, 8. Transportation services, including transport by ambulance.” (CMS, 2014b).
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itself as a significant share of the health care services is reimbursed by the government
transferring public resources. By 2010, the largest single buyer of services in the hospital
market is the CMS2 which administer $378.5 billion corresponding to 46:5% of the to-
tal hospital expenditures costs in the US (NCHS, 2013). The private parties, mostly the
health insurance companies, providing the costs incurred by the hospital services imitate
the government designing similar reimbursement schemes.
CMS data displays a steady growth in the total cost of providing health care in the
US. CMS analysis explains that the overall rise in hospital charges is a considerable driver
of the increase in the total expenditure in health care services. It is apparent that in the
past two decades hospitals managed to enhance their bargaining power against the payors
in the industry. CMS estimates that this trend is unlikely to alter in the near future. The
projection regarding the spending on hospital care show that in 2022 the bill will reach
19% of GDP with an average annual increase of 6:4%. Given the economic outlook with
an expected slowdown in growth, the burden on the society will likely to become even
more difficult to carry (CMS, 2014c). It is a dynamic industry and it requires a profound
effort to keep up with the shifting powers and constantly altering game plan.
There has been an immense restructuring of the hospital system in the US over the
last couple of decades initiated mainly by the radical change in the health care reimburse-
ment policy in 1983. The shift from cost-based reimbursements to the Prospective Pay-
ment System (PPS)3 created a new system where hospitals have to compete for patients.
Following that, in the 1990s, numerousUS states removed the restrictions on private health
insurance companies to engage in selective contracting with health care providers. This
has strengthened the incentives for restructuring leading to a second wave of change in the
hospital markets as depicted in Figure 1. This reestablishment, leading to a significantly
concentrated market, is considered as the fundamental reason behind the surge in the costs
of the hospital care (OECD, 2012).
Dranove & White (1994) completed an extensive survey focusing on the studies
regarding the role of competition in the hospital market. Although the survey consists
of studies using quite different methodologies for defining the geographic and product
markets, there was a consensus on the fact that market concentration has a statistically
2The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) defines itself as follows: “CMS, previously
known as the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), is a federal agency within the United States
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) that administers the Medicare program and works in
partnership with state governments to administer Medicaid, the State Children’s Health Insurance Program
(SCHIP), and health insurance portability standards” (CMS, 2014b).
3CMS defines PPS as follows: “Hospitals contract with Medicare to furnish acute hospital inpatient
care and agree to accept predetermined acute IPPS rates as payment in full. The inpatient hospital benefit
covers beneficiaries for 90 days of care per episode of illness with an additional 60-day lifetime reserve.
[H]ospitals receive Medicare IPPS payment on a per discharge or per case basis for Medicare beneficiaries
with inpatient stays” (CMS, 2014a).
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Figure 1: Trends in Hospital Concentration, M&A Activity and HMO Penetration: 1990-
2006 (Gaynor & Town, 2011)
significant positive correlation with the price increases in the hospital market. Also, Town
et al. (2006) support this theory presenting that the mergers during the 1990s have resulted
in on average 3.2% higher HMO premiums.
Historical data on hospital market concentration provides a compatible portrayal of
the theory suggested above. Between 1979 and 2001, the percentage of hospitals that
operate as part of a system has spiked from 31 to 54.4 In addition to the rising num-
ber of consolidations, the consolidations have become increasingly localized having a
further impact on the relevant markets. In other words, it has become more likely to en-
counter “within market” consolidations which occur between a number of hospitals in the
same geographic and product market in comparison with the “across market” consolida-
tions. Cuellar & Gertler (2003) state that thinking of geographic markets equivalent to the
metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) nineteen MSAs showed a trend of increasing con-
centration with seven of them having an HHI level 1700 points higher than the starting
level. It is mentioned in Gaynor & Town (2011) that in the US HHI for hospital markets
increased on average by over 900 points between 1987 and 2006 as displayed in Figure 2
(OECD, 2012). It is remarkable that the mean HHI value has clearly surpassed the “high
concentration” threshold level of 2500 points (DOJ & FTC, 1997). Capps (2010) explains
that the general approach of the US Courts in evaluating the hospital markets inadvertently
had a major impact on the formation of this rush of M&As in the hospital market. Con-
tradicting the plethora of evidence5 indicating that the competition in the hospital market
is quite local in geographical context, in most cases the US Courts favoured wide market
definitions. Letting the watchdogs lose their teeth, between 1993 and 2008, not a single
4If the hospitals that are loosely connected with the hospital networks are included, this ratio increases
from 54 to 66 percent of the total number of hospitals in the US (FTC, 2004).
5See Town et al. (2006) and Varkevisser & Schut (2012).
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Figure 2: Hospital Market Concentration, USa, 1987-2006 (Gaynor & Town, 2011)
merger challenge6 was concluded in favor of Department of Justice (DOJ)/Federal Trade
Commission (FTC).
While under constant scrutiny for their potential cost on the society, hospital consol-
idations are also regarded beneficial mentioning the efficiencies generated (FTC, 2004).
It is claimed that consolidations are decent means for eliminating duplications in services
and unnecessary administrative costs, relaxing the medical arms race between the agents
in the market. The trade-off between the positive and negative impacts of the M&As in
the hospital markets will be analyzed thoroughly in the following chapters.
3 Evaluation of Hospital Merger and Acquisitions
Since 1981, the first time a hospital merger is challenged by FTC7, evaluation of the hos-
pital mergers from an antitrust perspective has been an active policy field. In order to
allocate their resources efficiently, the authorities try to run a number of filtering mech-
anisms by imposing safety zones and identify the suspicious transactions. According to
the Health Care Statement, the safety zones applied in hospital markets include the par-
6California v. Sutter Health System (2000), FTC v Tenet Healthcare Corp. (1998), United States v.
Long Island Jewish Medical Center (1997), FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp. (1996), United States v.
Mercy Health Services (1995), FTC v. Freeman Hospital (1995), In re Adventist Health System (2004).
7Am. Med. Int’l v. FTC, 104 FTC 1 (1984), as modified by 104 FTC 617 (1984) and 107 FTC 310
(1986)
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ties which have a licensed capacity below 100 beds over the three most recent years, and
have under normal circumstances an inpatient count less than 40 over the three most years.
Also the parties which have been operational for a period less than 5 years are excluded
from the safety zones (FTC, 1996). These filters keep the number of probed transactions
limited enabling the authorities to provide an involved analysis for each case.
Hospital mergers are analyzed following the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which
define market power as “the ability profitably to maintain prices above competitive levels
for a significant period of time.” The Horizontal Merger Guidelines provide a recipe for
the examination of the antitrust issues which may arise due to merger activity (DOJ &
FTC, 1997). In essence, it is suggested that a merger analysis should be initiated with
checking the existence of any direct evidence which would simply reveal the presence of a
misconduct. Following the initial step, it is considered appropriate to identify the relevant
product and geographic markets. There is an abundance of methods for the identification
of markets and no consensus over the “right” one. However it is accepted that, in case
of the availability of sufficient data, the hypothetical monopolist test, namely SSNIP test
(small but significant and non-transitory increase in price), is an appropriate method to
acquire a general perception about the case at hand. Analysis is run by testing a larger
product group or geographic area which are enlarged with each iteration of the test until
the substitution alternatives are exhausted (Sacher & Silvia, 1998). Also in case of any
problems with the data availability, which is a common occurrence, there is a general
tendency to switch to the indirect analysis methods, namely the Elzinga-Hogarty test and
Critical Loss Analysis which are less data-intensive in comparison with the SSNIP test.
The preference of the tests undertaken and the interpretation by courts has received
significant criticism. In fact, between 1994 and 2000, only seven of the 900 hospital
mergers were litigated. Surprisingly, courts decided in favor of the alleged parties in all
seven cases. This extraordinary statistic points out that the legal machinery is not working
properly. A closer look on these court decisions show that there are a number of epicenters
that cause most of the controversy: methodology for defining geographic and product
markets, expectations regarding the effects of the non-profit status of the hospitals and
the weight given to the possible positive welfare effects of the hospital consolidations. A
detailed analysis of these headlines is required in order to address the problem and propose
appropriate cures.
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3.1 Geographic Market Definition
Identifying the geographic market is a central part of the merger analysis. Any error,
leading to an unnecessarily large geographic market definition, renders the authorities
powerless in fulfilling their responsibilities. In current legislation hospital markets do
not constitute a special case which requires a unique approach in market identification.
This is a crucial loophole in the legislation. In fact, Judge Richard Posner states that “the
law concerning hospital [geographic] market definition is in a shambles. Common sense
suggests that health care, like politics, is local. People want to be hospitalized near their
families and homes, in hospitals in which their own – local – doctors have privileges”
(Hammer & Sage, 2003).
As explained above, case law shows that there are two popular tests for determining
the geographic market: Elzinga-Hogarty test and Critical Loss Analysis. It is vital to
perform a meticulous analysis of these methods in order to figure out the causes of the
frequent misinterpretation of the relevant markets.
Elzinga-Hogarty test is one of the most widely used tests in antitrust policy. Its
popularity dwells from its practicality and simplicity with a low degree of data require-
ment. Designed for commodity movements, it is based on two statistics of commodity
flow: LIFO (“little in from outside”) and LOFI (“little out from inside”). If it is con-
cluded that the candidate geographic market shows a considerable degree of isolation in
terms of commodity flows8. If the flows in any direction consists of less than 10% of
the total commodity flows in the candidate geographic market, it is considered a “strong”
market definition and in case of a inter-market flow of between 10-25%, it is considered
a “weak” market definition.
In the hospital markets, the patients are considered as the “commodity” and patient
flows are interpreted in order to reach a conclusion regarding the relevant geographic
market. It is certain that a lump-sum analysis of patient behavior does not provide any
consistent information about the market dynamics. As health care services show an enor-
mous degree of differentiation, the buyers of the services, the patients, also consist of
significantly different characteristics. The heterogeneity of the hospital market erodes the
validity of the application of the Elzinga-Hogarty test as Kenneth Elzinga and Thomas
Hogarty themselves argued that their methodology was inherently not suitable for analyz-
ing differentiated goods (FTC, 2004).
8By “commodity” hereby, the elements of the relevant product market are addressed.
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Another weak spot of the Elzinga-Hogarty test is its naivety in assuming that hospi-
tal choice of patients have a univariate characteristic depending solely on price changes.
However it is a tremendous leap of faith ignoring the fundamental facts of consumer the-
ory. FTC (2004) claims that research shows travel distance is the fundamental criterion
for hospital choice. Also there are a large number of factors such as insurance cover-
age, service quality, familiarity with the facilities and family connections that affect the
hospital choice of the patients. Reducing all these factors to a simple monetary decision
ignores a multitude of essential information and thus leads to a biased interpretation of
future patient flows in case of a merger.
In addition to that, Elzinga-Hogarty test relies heavily on a flawed assumption that
the patient flow data is perfectly representative for the whole population in the candidate
market area. A minority of the relevant population group that is visible in the data should
not be considered as the basis of a projection of the welfare effects of a hospital con-
solidation. Capps et al. (2001) coined the term “silent majority fallacy” to explain this
misjudgment. They state that the existence of a traveler between candidate markets does
not prove that the agents in the candidate market lack market power as the traveler cannot
be considered as a perfect representation of the choice of the whole population. This rep-
resentation problem is exacerbated by the heterogeneity issue detailed above. Capps et al.
also emphasize that empirical evidence points out overall reluctance of patients to travel
further for receiving similar health care services at a lower price. In practice, the degree
of substitutability between hospitals diminish rapidly with increasing travel distances.
It is also noteworthy to mention two intrinsic caveats of the Elzinga-Hogarty test.
FTC (2004) explains that constructing the merger analysis upon the LIFO and LOFI cri-
teria is inappropriate for the hospital markets as it might be impossible to meet the criteria
in some cases. As new hospitals are included in the analysis with each iteration of the
test, it might not be accomplished to reach the required level of patient flow isolation. It
results in unnecessarily large market definitions and in some cases failure to define geo-
graphic markets. This leaves us with the trade-off between absence of geographic market
definition and a “weak” market definition which does not provide sufficient confidence in
the analysis. The second caveat of the test dwells from ignoring the fact that population
density is not constant over a candidate market area. The variance of population density
leads to including regions that should have been excluded and including regions that in
fact do not contain a significant amount of patient flows in terms of the ratio to the size of
the relevant population group (FTC, 2004).
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The second popular approach in merger analysis is to apply the Critical Loss Anal-
ysis. It is a decent method providing a straightforward and simple analysis in defining
relevant geographic markets. On the other hand, it requires great care in application as it
is plagued by various problems due to its susceptibility of being abused, creating confusion
over the facts.
The first issue is the misunderstanding regarding the conclusiveness of the analysis.
It is a common mistake to jump to a conclusion in a scenario where a hypothetical monop-
olist incurs losses in case of a 5% price increase. However, empirical studies show that
it is of utmost importance to test for alternative scenarios where alternative price increase
percentages are posited. It is presented that cases exist where the hypothetical monopolist
incurs losses at a 5% price increase scenario, although it becomes profitable when a per-
centage between 31 and 319 is selected for the posited price increase (FTC, 2004). The
market dynamics do not possess a linear relationship with the pricing; hence it is a serious
oversimplification to base the analysis over a linearity assumption.
Secondly, the misconception regarding the reasoning behind the pre-merger profit
margins creates significant problems. The mechanics of the analysis lead to an inappropri-
ate geographic market definition. Following the critical loss analysis, an extremely broad
market definition is achieved where the test subject is a hypothetical monopolist with a
high profit margin. High margins are usually translated into low critical loss amounts.
Hence it becomes quite probable for the actual losses to exceed the defined critical loss
thresholds. However, this train of thought is far-fetched and loosely connected with the
economic theory. In an alternative point of view consistent with the economic theory,
high profit margin can also be interpreted as low price elasticities of demand (O‘Brien &
Wickelgren, 2003). In addition to that checking for the “aggregate diversion ratio” I can
expect the firm-level elasticities to be quite higher than the market-level elasticities which
results in a very low degree of price elasticity of demand for the candidate geographic
market (Katz & Shapiro, 2003). This can be spelled out as minuscule sales losses to be
faced by the merged entities. Hence the appropriate decision would rather be to delineate
a narrow geographic market in contradiction with the common preferences.
A final problematic point is that it is a common oversight to ignore the fact that
price changes in the market can show considerable complexities. As explained above,
hospital markets consist of heterogeneous characteristics, hence it is not coherent with the
economic theory to assume that the whole range of services in the market would show
the same price movements. A lump-sum critical loss analysis would not be fruitful in
simulating the realities of the candidate market. This misconception is usually accompa-
nied with the inconsistent expectations regarding the pricing behavior of the rival agents
in the candidate market. It is insubstantial to expect the rivals of the merging entities to
keep their prices constant facing a shift in the market structure (FTC, 2004). Therefore
9
Figure 3: The Impact of Willingness to Travel (Oxera, 2011)
a ceteris paribus approach in utilizing the critical loss analysis would be inconclusive, at
best.
3.2 Product Market Definition
Similar to the geographic market definition, The Horizontal Merger Guidelines are con-
sidered as the policy basis for the delineation of the product market without providing any
specific policies for the hospital markets. Therefore, defining product markets is also an
unresolved field with a vacuum of consensus over the details of the design of the market
definition methodologies.
This vacuum bears high costs as the product market definition lies at the core of
the merger analysis. Every argument mentioned above regarding the identification of the
geographic market is based on the delineation of the product market. The analyses change
their courses drastically following any updation in the product market definition. The
clusters of services formed result in different degrees of willingness to travel affecting
the price elasticities of demand in relevant candidate markets. A most basic example of
the role of product market definition is depicted in Figure 3. The approval of a merger
between hospitals A and B depends on aggregate willingness to travel of patients in the
candidate market. If the product market is defined as a cluster of services which lead to
a low degree of willingness to travel, then the hospitals C, D and E would be left outside
the reach of the patients and the consolidation would be rendered anticompetitive.
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Historically, the product market has been defined as an aggregation of inpatient ser-
vices, namely “acute general hospital care” (Gaynor & Vogt, 2000). This aggregation
eased the merger analyses by alleviating the necessity of testing the anticompetitive ef-
fect for each inpatient service category. However as displayed above, such simplification
might harm the validity of the whole analysis unless it is applied with precision.
Another aspect of the product market definition is constructed based on complexity
of care provided by the hospitals in the candidate market. In the case law, we observe
that specialty hospitals were in general excluded from the product market. Varkevisser
et al. (2008) offer an alternative approach for delineating the product market by defin-
ing five clusters for the acute general hospital care: “1) high-volume complex specialties,
2) low-volume complex specialties, 3) high-volume regular specialties, 4) low-volume
regular specialties and 5) specialties that can be provided by general or specialized hospi-
tals and stand-alone ambulatory surgeries.” This classification is plausible since hospitals
construct their investment strategies based on the available health care services in the lo-
cality. Also, evidence gathered from hospital planning documents show that hospitals in
the locality are identified as rivals based on their service level sophistication. Another
alternative is explained by Zwanziger et al. (1994) as a list of factors to be considered in
clustering services: “1) the extent to which treatments for two diseases can be performed
by the same personnel and equipment, and 2) the cost for a hospital to convert from pro-
viding one treatment to providing another treatment.” It is also argued that “physicians
(consultants) are the key inputs into hospital care, and cluster diseases based on the least-
specialised physician capable of treating them” (FTC, 2004).
3.3 Non-profit Status of Hospitals and Welfare Effects
Case law displays that the institutional status of the hospitals recently gained an increased
importance in the court decisions in merger investigations. In the prior landmark cases,
the courts seemed to have a tendency towards interpreting the non-profit status irrelevant
to the essence of the cases rejecting any efficiency claims based on non-profit status. In
1986, the Seventh Court declared that “different ownership structures might reduce the
likelihood of collusion, … this possibility is conjectural,” and that “adoption of the non-
profit form does not change human nature.” Also in 1991, a similar comment was given
by the Eleventh Court: “the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that nonprofit corpora-
tions act under such a different set of incentives than for-profit corporations that they are
entitled to an implicit exemption from the antitrust laws.” Similarly in 1990, the Seventh
Circuit clarified their legal interpretation regarding the non-profit status of the hospitals:
“We are aware of no evidence – and the [appellees] present none, only argument – that
11
nonprofit suppliers of goods or services are more likely to compete vigorously than profit-
making suppliers. ... If the managers of nonprofit enterprises are less likely to strain after
that last penny of profit, they may be less prone to engage in profit-maximizing collu-
sion but by the same token less prone to engage in profit-maximizing competition” (FTC,
2004).
However in the late 1990s, there has been a reversal in the legal interpretation and
non-profit status has turned into a key to unlock legal barriers against hospital consolida-
tions. In 1997, two cases exemplify the change in the legal trend 9. In these cases, courts
focused on the idea that the question was not whether a non-profit hospital would also
acquire profits, but what would be done with the retained profits. The emergent dominant
view was that these hospitals were run with a community service mission and any profits
would mean further community service. This interpretation resulted in several cases to be
concluded in favor of the merging parties.
Considering non-profit status as a mitigating factor for market power has been a
dominant legal view until early 2000s. Recently, it was challenged by a number of em-
pirical academic studies supporting that non-profit status can provide no mitigating effect
for the market power acquired following a consolidation and it should not be considered
as a guarantor of protecting social welfare through securing the realization of claimed
efficiencies (FTC, 2004).
As mentioned above, the claimed welfare effects can play a decisive role in the
merger investigations. These claimed effects are usually focused on avoided capital ex-
penditures, decreasing costs of management and operational activities and increased pro-
ductivity by ceasing medical arms race. In numerous cases, the claimed efficiencies were
sufficient in convincing the courts in allowing the consolidations. However, retrospective
studies show that there is a considerable number of cases where the efficiencies were ex-
acerbated or simply did not happen. For instance in Blodgett/Butterworth case in 1997, it
was proposed that the merger would generate $100 million in avoided costs and efficien-
cies and this was influential in court’s decision. Also, the non-profit status of the hospital
under consideration was interpreted as a guarantee.
On the other hand, FTC (2004) states that the claimed efficiencies should not be
overvalued as it can take a considerably long period of time to realize all the efficiency
promises. Indeed in Blodgett/Butterworth case, the merged entity could not achieve the
projected operational enhancements and in the following six years not even half of the
proposed amount of $100 million in avoided costs and efficiencies was realized. Commu-
nity commitments were offered as a solution for the failed efficiencies problem, however
9FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 1997-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,863, 71,867-68 (6th Cir.1997), United
States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 149, 146 (E.D.N.Y.1997)
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it should not be overlooked that these contracts all have an expiration date and there is no
certainty for their renewal in the future. Hence, considering uncertain efficiency proposals
as a balancing act for possible burdens on the community through increased out-of-pocket
expenses and health insurance premiums would result in biased decisions threatening the
social welfare.
4 Data Specific Issues in Hospital Merger and Acquisition Analysis
I have provided a detailed list of the much debated points regarding the evaluation of
hospital consolidations in the previous chapter. It would be an appropriate step to move on
to a brief literature survey pointing out common problems and searching for amendments
for the merger evaluation process. It is not surprising that the early academic studies
specialized in hospital consolidations conducted in the 1980s and 90s are plagued with
a number of misconceptions and technical frailties. The inconsistencies dwelling from
these analyses have resulted in biased estimates and equipped merging parties with hollow
but convincing arguments which have resulted in a streak of case losses for the FTC. In
addition to the problems related to the market definition methodologies, we frequently
encounter a number of other data specific issues.
A foremost issue with the prior studies is that the analyses were too often based on
hospital chargemaster prices but not the actual ones. Although it might be a fair assump-
tion to proxy actual prices with listed prices, in case of hospital markets, an epitome of
monopsony power, this preference significantly weakens the integrity of the study. Hence,
it is of utmost importance to count for the relevant data problems, whenever such assump-
tions are made due to data availability issues. A similar problem occurs when there is
an improper implementation of a proxy for actual patient flows. It is cumbersome, and
impossible in most cases to acquire actual patient flows, hence the general approach is
to construct a proxy value to delineate the geographic markets. For that purpose, usually
geopolitical, population based or distance based measures are implemented. The prior
literature shows that improper results might be obtained misleading the authorities when
these are utilized without controlling for their caveats. A most basic example for such
caveats is that when administrative regions are selected as a representative of the geo-
graphic markets, it can lead to inconsistencies for the analysis based on hospitals that are
located close to borders as cross-border effects are ignored by such measurement strategy.
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A second aspect of the problem with the utilization of the price data is related with
the product market definition. As explained in the previous chapter, product market defi-
nition lies at the core of themerger analysis. Any error by its delineation creates a snowball
effect causing even larger inconsistencies in the further steps of the analysis. Therefore,
it is better to suffer increased computational costs by assuming a small product market to
start with, rather than to risk discrediting the whole study. Product markets chosen at the
DRG-level10 would increase the complexity of the model; however it would greatly dimin-
ish the risks of overlooking any market dynamics. The studies conducted by Brooks et al.
(1997) , Connor et al. (1998) and Manheim et al. (1994) all use lump-sum price values
for hospital admissions. However, this contradicts with the basics of business strategies
by overlooking the possibility of cross-product subsidization or exploitation of bargaining
power on single services.
Another noteworthy point in the merger analysis is to control for the heterogene-
ity of the hospital characteristics. Without differentiating for the functional type of the
hospital, its location and/or the overall service quality, it is improbable to generate unbi-
ased estimates. For instance teaching hospitals and the hospitals located in urban centers
are usually burdened with more severely ill patients and therefore they bear higher costs
per patient. Also without including a proxy for the service quality we cannot identify the
reasoning behind any price movements clearly. Therefore, any mechanism designed for
interpreting effects of the market concentration should consist of sufficient corrective el-
ements to offset these disruptive factors. A decent example of such design is provided
by Capps & Dranove (2004). They have opposed the general trend in the relevant liter-
ature regarding the utilization of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). In general HHI
is computed based on the whole geopolitical region such as the metropolitan area or the
predefined HSA (Health Service Area). However, this methodology ignores the effects
related with the heterogeneity of the hospital markets. Instead, Capps & Dranove (2004)
preferred constructing the HHI using patient-level inpatient hospitalization data, which is
consistent with the theory provided above.
One final point is about the choice of econometric model. Most studies are restricted
to a cross sectional analysis only. However assuming the researcher is faced with data
availability issues at some level, this methodology intensifies the risks of generating biased
estimates. Using cross-sectional data, it is difficult to control for heterogeneity among the
hospitals and the tested services. On the other hand, introducing a time dimension, panel
data format eases the burden of the data requirements for the estimation. Defining a control
group for the merging parties, the estimated effects of the transaction under scrutiny can
be identified without the need of acquiring a colossal amount of qualitative data.
10According to the CMS, discharges are assigned to diagnosis-related groups (DRG), a classification
system that groups similar clinical conditions (diagnoses) and the procedures furnished by the hospital during
the stay (CMS, 2014a).
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5 An Alternative Approach to Market Definition
In the previous chapters, I have put forward the shortcomings of the various techniques
in formulating an M&A analysis in the hospital markets. These shortcomings have been
exploited by the major players in the market, namely the hospitals, and rendered the FTC
ineffective in maintaining a healthy level of competition in the market. The retrospective
studies11 conducted by the FTC show that the common issue with the antitrust cases in the
hospital markets is that the evidence and theories stated by the authorities are frequently
found inconclusive by the courts. Although the theories under scrutiny bears sound eco-
nomic foundations, their inherent complexity and fundamental assumptions resulted in
lack of confidence in the courts’ judgment.
Hence, as an initial step towards bringing the antitrust authorities and the courts on
the same page, I attempt to provide a metric that would have a minimal amount of assump-
tions while delivering a big picture of the relevant market. In order to realize its promises
the metric should be interpreted as a tool for providing basic guidance and credibility for
rather sophisticated econometric tools. In essence, the purpose of this chapter is to create a
metric to display the drawbacks of the current methods and to lay foundations for a better
method.
Based on the specifications above, it is natural to infer that a precise definition of
the geographic market goes out of the window. In order to avoid violating the dynamic
and heterogeneous nature of the markets, the metric should be designed in a modest way
delivering only a sense of the boundaries of the market accompanied with the basic symp-
toms of the market characteristics. Therefore, the metric I develop is based on the level
of competitive pressure in the geographic proximity of the hospitals. Given the apparent
misguidance created by delineating a precise geographic market based on administrative
districts, placing competitive pressure at the core of the metric design points out the het-
erogeneity and locality of the competition in the hospital markets.
The key aspect of the metric fulfilling its promises is the utilization of travel-time
data. A significant level of credibility of the underlying data is achieved following the
principles of Wang’s methodology12 in obtaining the travel-time data. Depicting general
acute hospitals in California as nodes, the neighbouring nodes for each hospital are de-
termined by applying certain travel-time ranges. The nodes that fall within the specified
range formed up the neighbourhood for each hospital. In the next step, for each node in
a neighbourhood, the number of intersections with other neighbourhoods is calculated. I
11See Farrell et al. (2009), Haas Wilson & Garmon (2011), Tenn (2011) and Thompson (2011)
12See Wang & Xu (2011)
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propose the statistical average of the number of intersections for each neighbour within
the neighbourhood of a hospital as the “competitive pressure rate”. In order to test this
new metric, I run simple OLS regression to estimate its effects on hospital charges.
5.1 The Data
I use mainly two data resources, namely State of California Office of Statewide Health
Planning and Development (OSHPD) and Google Maps. I have acquired the coordinates
and physical and financial attributes of hospitals utilizing the databases of OSHPD. The
travel-time data is generated using the public data provided by Google Maps.
The gross patient revenue, non-operating revenue, operating expenses and cost-to-
charge ratio are acquired from the Complete Set of Hospital Annual Financial data which
contains audited data provided by general acute care hospitals in the state of California.
The database entails comprehensive information regarding type of ownership, number of
beds, balance sheets and income statements, revenues by payer, and expenses. In order
to provide consistency and robustness, I use the 2009-2010 and 2011-2012 versions of
the financial database. In order to create a consistent proxy for the prices charged for
patient services, I have used the patient discharge data aggregated at the hospital level.
The data provided by OSHPD contains the total number of discharges, average charge per
stay, average charge per day and average length of stay for all availableMedicare-Severity
Diagnosis RelatedGroups (MS-DRGs) for each hospital. Similar to the financial attributes
data, I use the 2009-2010 and 2011-2012 versions of the database. Finally, the last portion
of the OSHPD data contains snapshots of the Healthcare Atlas which is a comprehensive
geographic information system application (OSHPD, 2014a).
The secondmain data source of this study is the geographic information systems data
provided by Google Maps. I have created a statewide database including the travel-times
between the general acute care hospitals in California. I use Google’s Distance Matrix
service to compute the travel-times in terms of minutes. In order to obtain a high level of
accuracy in the travel-time data I have followed a certain procedure for the data generation
process which is detailed in the following chapter.
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5.2 Methodology
The main contribution of this study lies in the application of the idiosyncratic competitive
pressure metric in the analysis of the hospital markets. The development of this metric is
based on a data-intensive highly accurate travel-time calculation. The calculation method
diverges from the common crow-fly distance measurement (often encountered in fixed
radii catchment analysis) and direct application of administrative areas which only result
in a crude adaptation of reality.
The utilization of travel-time data also includes fundamental methodological differ-
ences. The most apparent dichotomy is between depending on online geographic informa-
tion systems services such as Google Maps and MapQuest, and developing an algorithm
based on road network data and speed impedances running on GIS software. I prefer
constructing the analysis over a travel-time matrix based on real-time Google Maps data.
Wang &Xu provide a comprehensive comparison between these two approaches by
testing a sample dataset on the Google Maps API and the ArcGIS Network Analyst. They
state that the Google Maps API approach shows overall superiority utilizing an up-to-date
road network, real-time traffic congestion data and alleviating the database preparation ne-
cessity to a great extent. Despite these advantages it should be kept in mind that depending
on Google Maps data brings a number of limitations to the analysis such as restricted cal-
culation duration and amount in a specific time interval accompanied with a limit on the
number of variables in a calculation.
I follow the Google Maps API approach using the Distance Matrix service. In order
to deal with the limitation mentioned above I develop a basic algorithm which provides
automation in database construction and divides the queries in relatively small pieces to
overcome the query limitations. In order to implement this algorithm, I use Google Apps
Script accompanied by Google Sheets to store the acquired data.
Despite the advantages described above, this data generation methodology entails
three major assumptions which could lead to complications. I mitigate the potential effects
of the caveats that might arise from these three points by introducing a number of counter-
measures, therefore the methodology does not include any significant shortcomings that
would discredit the statistical results.
The first point is that the travel-time data is generated based on the up-to-date road
network and current traffic congestion levels. As the analysis is based on the 2010 and
2012 snapshot of the hospital markets, this process assumes that there has been no dif-
ference in the road network and congestion levels within the time period between 2010
and 2014. In order to mitigate the effects of any problems based on this assumption, I
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opt to use the generated data only in an ordinal way creating a ranking within the same
dataset. Therefore, any changes in the quality of the road network or congestion levels
would affect the metric based on the travel-time data in a similar way for each element of
the database.
The second point is relatedwith the dynamic property of the traffic congestion levels.
As the congestion level varies over time on different scales at each region, a comparison
between travel-times acquired at different moments might be misleading. In order to ame-
liorate this problem, I execute the data generation process at a certain time interval of the
day. Hence, the distance data can be considered comparable to a great extent.
The final point is that the Distance Matrix service has a certain daily query limit,
hence it becomes cumbersome to deal with big data (Wang & Xu, 2011). Processing
large quantities of data might take a significant amount of time and therefore intensify
the effects of the caveat discussed at the previous point. I prefer restricting the data gen-
eration process following a filtering mechanism, hence keeping the amount of data at a
manageable degree. As an initial step, I calculate the crow-fly distances formulating an
origin-destination matrix (OD matrix) for general acute hospitals in California. Next, I
rank the neighbours of every hospital based on their crow-fly distance value. Using the
rankings I have decided on a cutoff at 60th neighbour for each hospital filtering out 87%of
the distance calculations. I calculate the travel-times for the simplified version of the OD
matrix and ranked the neighbours based on travel-times. The neighbours surviving the
filtering are ranked again with respect to the travel-time values generated by the Distance
Matrix Service. I apply a second cutoff at 45th neighbor in order to avoid any nuisance
caused by the crow-fly distance ranking in the initial step. In this way, the data processing
becomes feasible and more consistent as the disruptive time effect explained in the second
point is mitigated.
The resultingODmatrix consists of all 462 general acute care hospital and the travel-
time data for the closest 45 neighbouring general acute care hospitals for each one. The
distance between any hospital and its farthest neighbor in the OD matrix is at least 30
minutes, hence it is appropriate to run any test with a threshold distance up to 30 minutes.
I create two additional matrices with specific range values (20 and 30 minutes) for
both December 2010 and 2012 snapshots of the market. In order to have a sense of the size
of the geographical area these ranges correspond to, I execute a basic test comparing the
administrative regions which any hospital and its farthest neighbor within the specified
range belong to. In the dataset with 20 minutes range, 82% of the hospitals share the same
county and with the farthest available neighbor. When the threshold is increased to 30
minutes, the same condition applies for 63% of the hospitals. Hence, it is safe to think
that a 20 minute travel-time range results in a geographic area smaller than the county
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of any hospital. The extreme locality of the data is crucial in interpreting the pecuniary
effects of proximity among hospitals. In the next chapter, the specifications and validity
of these effects are discussed.
5.3 The Analysis
My primary aim is to depict the effects of geographic properties of the markets on prices.
Hence, I include a minimal number of proxies, namely “total operational expenses” and
“cost-to-charge ratio” which speak for numerous variables, in my econometric model.
OSHPD (2014b) defines “total operational expenses” as “the total direct expenses incurred
by various cost center groups for providing patient care by the hospital which include
salaries and wages, employee benefits, professional fees, supplies, purchased services,
and other expenses” and the cost-to-charge ratio is defined as “the relationship between
the hospital’s cost of providing services and the charge assessed by the hospital for the
service.” In other words, cost-to-charge ratio is the difference between a hospital’s total
operating expenses and total other operating revenue divided by gross patient revenue. I
construct a simplistic econometric model focusing on the effects of the competitive pres-
sure metric on average annual charges per day at the DRG-level. The equation selected
for the OLS regression is as follows:
ln drgpday# = intrt20 + ccr + ln tot_op_exp+  (1)
Here, ln drgpday# is the logarithm of the average annual charges by any hospital at
the DRG level. In the output tables the symbol “#” is replaced by the relevant DRG code.
intrt20 is the competitive pressure rate for the 20 minutes range providing the aver-
age number of intersections of the neighbouring hospitals of the selected hospital with the
neighbourhoods of the other hospitals in the OD matrix. This measure is a proxy for the
level of competition in close quarters depicting the average intensity of the competitive
pressure in the neigbourhood of a hospital.
ccr and ln tot_op_exp are financial attributes as explained above providing a large
scale proxy for all the factors that might have an effect on the price levels. As the focal
point of this study is the effects of geographic properties of the markets on prices, I intend
to point out the effect of these factors in a lump sum manner instead of elaborating their
singular effects by introducing specific proxy variables.
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I apply a set of measures to improve the confidence in the results of the model. As
an initial step, I exclude any samples with less than 100 observations for drgpday#, hence
reducing the number of the DRGs to be analyzed to 39 for the 2010 data and 43 for the
2012 data. In the next step, interpreting the regression output, I eliminate models that
contain any independent variables that are statistically non-significant at the 5% level.
Also, the models that fail the F-test at the 5% level are eliminated. As a final measure, I
apply a regression specification error test (RESET) for omitted variables using the Stata
command “ovtest”.
The OLS estimation results are consistent with the theoretical expectations putting
forward that there exists a negative correlation between average prices and the compet-
itive pressure rate. Also, testing both for 20 minutes and 30 minutes ranges, the model
provides that the pecuniary effect of the competitive pressure rate increases in an expo-
nential manner with decreasing range values as displayed in Table 1 and Table 2.
The analysis provides a simple yet robust relationship between market characteris-
tics. However, it should be noted that there are two caveats which should be kept in mind
in any application of the ideas presented. First, I disregard potential effects of existence
of any hospital systems on price levels. Assuming that there is no difference between the
competition within and between firms, might have a disruptive effect on the relationship
presented in the study. However, taking into account the fact that market entities aim profit
maximization in a rather myopic manner the disruption is not expected to be considerable
(Ziss, 2007). Second, the proxy for prices is constructed as an annual average of hospital
charges at the DRG level. However, there is no control inherent in the calculation of the
proxy values for patient characteristics. Based on severity of cases, there might be cost
disparities which lead to different prices. As the proxy values are annual averages includ-
ing a large number of patient cases, I expect that casemix of patients would become similar
for every hospital in the database. On the other hand, in case of any DRG analysis with a
rather low patient volume, the disruptive impact of this caveat would be larger. Also, this
might be the reason that the most robust findings belong to normal newborn services, the
DRG with the highest patient volume. In further studies I expect to overcome this limita-
tion by working with unaggregated datasets taking the patient characteristics into account











333,106 Normal Newborn drgpday795 (33) Yes -0.0040** Yes -0.0071**
255,168 Vaginal Delivery w/o Com-
plicating Diagnoses
drgpday775 (30) No -0.0021* No -0.0040*
104,183 Cesarean Section w/o
CC/MCC
drgpday766 (28) No -0.0044*** No -0.0077***
71,366 Major Joint Replacement or
Reattachment Of Lower Ex-
tremity w/o MCC
drgpday470 (22) No -0.0023* No -0.0044**
64,768 Septicemia or Severe Sepsis
w/o Mv 96+ Hours w MCC
drgpday871 (36) No -0.0022* No -0.0042**
62,713 Esophagitis, Gastroent &
Misc Digest Disorders w/o
MCC
drgpday392 (19) - - No -0.0032*
50,949 Chest Pain drgpday313 (15) Yes -0.0029** Yes -0.0050**
43,766 Cesarean Section w CC/MCC drgpday765 (27) No -0.0030* No -0.0060**
37,640 Cellulitis w/o MCC drgpday603 (23) No -0.0018* No -0.0034*
34,167 Kidney & Urinary Tract In-
fections w/o MCC
drgpday690 (25) - - No -0.0032*
33,389 Uterine & Adnexa Proc
For Non-Malignancy w/o
CC/MCC
drgpday743 (26) No -0.0055*** No -0.0094***
19,384 Appendectomy w/o Com-
plicated Principal Diag w/o
CC/MCC
drgpday343 (18) No -0.0057*** No -0.0104***
17,874 Bronchitis & Asthma w/o
CC/MCC
drgpday203 (8) - - Yes -0.0047*
15,099 Heart Failure & Shock w CC drgpday292 (12) - - No -0.0041*
14,716 Respiratory System Diagno-
sis w Ventilator Support 96+
Hours
drgpday207 (9) Yes -0.0043** Yes -0.0069**
13,094 Laparoscopic Cholecys-
tectomy w/o C.D.E. w/o
CC/MCC
drgpday419 (20) No -0.0045** No -0.0074**
12,220 Infectious & Parasitic Dis-
eases w O.R. Procedure w
MCC
drgpday853 (34) Yes -0.0027** Yes -0.0048**
11,090 Septicemia or Severe Sepsis
w Mv 96+ Hours
drgpday870 (35) - - No -0.0031*
10,220 Simple Pneumonia &
Pleurisy w MCC
drgpday193 (5) Yes -0.0031* Yes -0.0063**
8,066 Cardiac Arrhythmia &
Conduction Disorders w/o
CC/MCC
drgpday310 (13) No -0.0030* No -0.0051*
7,949 Septicemia or Severe Sepsis
w/o Mv 96+ Hours w/o MCC
drgpday872 (37) No -0.0062*** No -0.0108***
5,154 Major Small & Large Bowel
Procedures w MCC
drgpday329 (17) No -0.0026* No -0.0045*
1,053 Wnd Debrid & Skn Grft Exc
Hand, For Musculo-Conn
Tiss Dis w MCC
drgpday463 (21) - - No -0.0070*











358,968 Psychoses drgpday885 (40) No -0.0043* No -0.0051*
313,781 Normal Newborn drgpday795 (35) Yes -0.0046*** Yes -0.0052*
237,696 Vaginal Delivery w/o Com-
plicating Diagnoses
drgpday775 (32) No -0.0027* Yes -0.0044*
97,807 Cesarean Section w/o
CC/MCC
drgpday766 (30) No -0.0043*** Yes -0.0082**
72,644 Major Joint Replacement or
Reattachment Of Lower Ex-
tremity w/o MCC
drgpday470 (23) No -0.0030** Yes -0.0036*
68,674 Septicemia or Severe Sepsis
w/o Mv 96+ Hours W MCC
drgpday871 (38) - - No -0.0038*
63,005 Esophagitis, Gastroent &
Misc Digest Disorders w/o
MCC
drgpday392 (20) No -0.0020* No -0.0091***
46,545 Cesarean Section W
CC/MCC
drgpday765 (29) No -0.0037** No -0.0055**
45,268 Chest Pain drgpday313 (15) - - No -0.0043***
41,723 Alcohol/Drug Abuse or De-
pendence w/o Rehabilitation
Therapy w/o M
drgpday897 (41) Yes -0.0073* No -0.0097***
39,534 Cellulitis w/o MCC drgpday603 (24) No -0.0024** Yes -0.0107**
26,917 Simple Pneumonia &
Pleurisy W CC
drgpday194 (6) - - No -0.0054***
24,928 Uterine & Adnexa Proc
For Non-Malignancy w/o
CC/MCC
drgpday743 (28) No -0.0074*** No -0.0043**
20,657 Septicemia or Severe Sepsis
w/o Mv 96+ Hours w/o MCC
drgpday872 (39) Yes -0.0047*** No -0.0124***
19,826 Heart Failure & Shock W
MCC
drgpday291 (12) - - No -0.0072***
18,029 Appendectomy w/o Com-
plicated Principal Diag w/o
CC/MCC
drgpday343 (18) No -0.0053*** No -0.0080***
13,314 Respiratory System Diagno-
sis W Ventilator Support 96+
Hours
drgpday207 (8) Yes -0.0051** No -0.0055**
13,042 Septicemia or Severe Sepsis
W Mv 96+ Hours
drgpday870 (37) - - Yes -0.0082***
12,533 G.I. Hemorrhage W CC drgpday378 (19) No -0.0026* No -0.0036*
12,512 Infectious & Parasitic Dis-
eases W O.R. Procedure W
MCC
drgpday853 (36) - - No -0.0033*
11,689 Laparoscopic Cholecys-
tectomy w/o C.D.E. w/o
CC/MCC
drgpday419 (21) No -0.0060*** No -0.0030*
8,427 Chronic Obstructive Pul-
monary Disease W MCC
drgpday190 (3) - - Yes -0.0082***
6,705 Simple Pneumonia &
Pleurisy W MCC
drgpday193 (5) - - No -0.0073*
2,137 Extensive O.R. Procedure
Unrelated To Principal
Diagnosis W MCC
drgpday981 (43) Yes -0.0035* - -
779 Wnd Debrid & Skn Grft Exc
Hand, For Musculo-Conn
Tiss Dis W MCC
drgpday463 (22) Yes -0.0056* - -
Table 2: Estimated Effects of Competitive Pressure Rate in 2012
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OSHPD data shows that in 2010 the total revenue of hospitals in California com-
prised an amount of $54:3 billion (CHCF, 2010). Hence, it is apparent that even the
slightest improvement in the market organization by considering the effects of the com-
petitive pressure rate would result in a humongous saving. Normal newborn services,
DRG 795, can be considered as the most reliable analysis as the price data utilized is
formed by the largest number of patient discharges, making up approximately 10% of to-
tal acute care discharges statewide. In California, general acute care hospitals charged a
total of $1; 330; 773; 000 and $1; 458; 098; 000 for normal newborn services in year 2010
and 2012, respectively (OSHPD, 2014b). Based on the estimated effects of the compet-
itive pressure rate, it is interpreted that a one-unit increase in the competitive pressure
rate13 with 20 minutes range would have resulted in an annual saving of $9; 448; 000 and
$7; 582; 000 in year 2010 and 2012, respectively.
In accordance with the findings in recent research discussed in the third chapter, it
is observed that health care services possess different characteristics and react idiosyn-
cratically to the market forces. The results of the analysis point that the competitive pres-
sure rate bears a significance especially in rather homogeneous and time-sensitive DRGs.
Therefore at the initiation of any antitrust investigations or M&A evaluations, a basic
probe focusing on the competitive pressure rate in the close proximity of an hospital re-
garding such health care services would provide valuable insight and allow the authorities
to use their resources in a more efficient manner.
6 Conclusion
Antitrust policy in hospital markets has been an epicenter of policy debates and there
have been a plethora of contradictory outcomes which defy the economic theory. In the
contemporary antitrust world, economics carry the burden of shedding light on the path
of the law. Cases are getting complicated and the alleged parties are coming up with even
more perplexing defences embroiled with computational models. In this environment,
case law shows that antitrust policy has failed to keep up with the increasing complexities
of the hospital markets.
I have provided an economic backdrop to the lost decade of antitrust policy focus-
ing on hospital consolidations in the US. Going over the insufficiencies of the applied
methods and I have attempted to explain the reasoning behind the ineffectiveness of the
antitrust policy. Following, a brief list of data specific issues aiming to formulate the
13This results in a price decrease of 0:71% in year 2010 and 0:52% in year 2012.
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data requirements of a sound hospital merger analysis, I have introduced an alternative
approach to market definition. Putting forward a simple metric emphasizing the interplay
between geography and prices, I have displayed the capability of this metric in effecting
market prices in a business-as-usual case in California. The analysis laid out in Chapter
5 proved that this metric is simple and accurate by construct and successful in providing
basic insight regarding the market structure.
In sum, what is necessary to achieve more effective markets and acquiring the ca-
pability protect current and potential competition is for the FTC to evaluate the policy
proposals in the literature and rebuild its reputation in courts. Hence, utilization of ba-
sic metrics that provide basic insight without creating any clouds of suspicion would be
essential in reaching these goals.
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